This paper extends the scope of Savage's subjective approach from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. In these environments the decision maker understands the uncertainty she is facing is affected by other decision makers in a similar situation. This contrast with classical decision making complicates the appropriate specification of the state space: as it is not exogenous, the uncertainty concerns not only the other decision makers' choices but also the behavioral rationale behind them. First, this problem is solved, constructing the state space explicitly -using hierarchies of preference relations -and then showing that this space indeed contains every relevant aspect of the decision maker's uncertainty. Since no restriction on preferences is imposed a priori, these results enable the analysis of behavior in games under any axiomatic structure. Second, conditions on preferences are characterized which imply that the decision maker behaves as if she is sure each other agent has preferences satisfying certain axioms, is himself sure each other agent's preferences satisfy certain axioms, and so on. Third, such characterization is provided for Savage's axioms. It is shown that a sequence of preference relations uniquely identifies the decision maker's utilities and beliefs, and also tells whether according to these beliefs each other agent is an expected utility maximizer, believes each other agent is, and so on.
Introduction
The behavioral premises and implications of subjective expected utility (henceforth SEU) theory are well understood in one-agent situations: Savage (1954) gave subjective foundations, hence behavioral content to the hypothesis that an individual is a SEU maximizer.
1 However, for interactive contexts, where it is further assumed informally that players share a "common assumption" of the SEU hypothesis, a similar treatment has not been given.
2 This paper concerns choice in such environments, where the hypothesis that a player is a SEU maximizer, believes each other player is, believes each other player believes each other player is, and so on, is not assumed, but rather must be derived, as in Savage, from rules on subjective preference. Motivation and Main Idea A one-agent problem of choice under uncertainty is defined by a set of states of the world, a set of outcomes, and a set of functions mapping states of the world into outcomes -Savage refers to such functions as acts.
3 The SEU hypothesis consists in specifying a utility function (a real function) on the set of outcomes and a subjective belief (a probability measure) over the set of states of the world. Acts can then be seen as random variables and ranked by their expected values, and solving the problem amounts to choosing an act with highest expected value among those available. According to the subjectivist view, however, utilities and probabilities should not be regarded as primitives of the theory, as they are just a mathematical representation the analyst makes of the decision maker's underlying attitude towards decisions under uncertainty.
4 If one accepts this view, it becomes necessary to provide a link between the SEU hypothesis (indeed the dominant one) and rules on behavior that can, at least in principle, be verified in practice. Establishing this link is precisely Savage's main contribution. Taking as primitive object only a preference relation on the set of acts, Savage identifies the axioms one must impose on this relation in order 1 For this reason, Savage's work has been described by Fishburn (1970) as "the most brilliant axiomatic theory of utility ever developed", and by Kreps (1988) as "the crowning achievement of single-person decision theory".
2 Over twenty years ago Kadane and Larkey (1982) remarked as a "curiosity of intellectual history" that Savage's theory and game theory had "had little to do with one another despite their common heritage" from the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . Their observation is still topical. Thus Aumann and Drèze (2002) point out that "the approach in Aumann (1987) remains incomplete in one important respect: Bayes rationality is assumed, not derived from primitive axioms of consistency". Their claim is very significative: even in Aumann's paper, motivated precisely by the subjectivist, Bayesian view, expected utility is not derived axiomatically.
3 A state of the world is interpreted -quoting Savage -as "a description of the object about which the person is concerned, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed". An outcome is interpreted as the ultimate consequence of the decision maker's choice. While concerned only with the outcome, the decision maker must choose one of the available acts without knowing the state of the world, hence without knowing what outcome will result. 4 De Finetti (1974) summarizes this view of probability saying that "probability does not exist".
to unambiguously identify a utility function and a subjective belief representing it.
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Now consider a game situation. This is defined by a set of players, a set of states of nature, and for each player a set of strategies, a set of outcomes, and an outcome function mapping states of nature and profiles of strategies into that player's outcomes. 6 In such an environment, the SEU hypothesis carries much more content. For every player subjective beliefs are assumed not only about the determinants of the outcome -states of nature and other players' strategies -but also about each other player's utilities and beliefs about states of nature and other players' strategies, about each other player's beliefs about each other player's utilities and beliefs, and so on.
7 Indeed, just as in the one-agent case, solving a player's problem amounts to choosing a strategy with highest expected utility, which can be identified based on her beliefs about states of nature and other players' strategies only. But, contrary to the one-agent case, beliefs are typically restricted by consistency requirements to formulate which the analyst is forced to assume beliefs about beliefs -for instance, the requirement that the player's beliefs put probability one on the event that each other player chooses a strategy maximizing expected utility.
Of course, such consistency requirements are the gist of strategic situations, and the possibility of formalizing them mathematically is the irremissible distinguishing feature of game theory. However, following Savage's approach, hence regarding the players' utilities and beliefs as representations of preference relations, one faces a conceptual and methodological problem. A state of the world for a player must be specified without explicit reference to other players' utilities and beliefs, as these are not to be treated as primitive objects. At the same time, in order to make sense out of beliefs about beliefs, its description must include each other player's preferences, 8 and this should be done without imposing any set of axioms a priori. 5 A preference relation is a set of ordered pairs of acts. The interpretation is that if a pair of acts belongs to the set then the decision maker considers the first act at least as good as the second. A subjective belief and a utility function represent the preference relation if the latter contains precisely those pairs of acts where the expected utility of the first act is at least as large as that of the second.
6 A state of nature is interpreted as a description of all factors that may affect the outcomes but are not under the players' control. Note that any uncertainty a player may have about her own or any other player's outcome function can be modelled as uncertainty about the state of nature.
7 This is done implicitly, following Harsanyi (1967-68) . A set of types for every player is introduced, and for every type of every player a utility function and a subjective belief over the states of nature and the other players' strategies and types is assumed. Mertens and Zamir (1985) proved that Harsanyi's idea implies no loss of generality, in the sense that any hierarchy of beliefs of a player can be generated by choosing sets of types appropriately.
8 In particular, it becomes necessary to reject Kadane and Larkey's (1982) proposition that "all aspects of [a player's] opinion except his opinion about his opponent's behavior are irrelevant, and can be ignored in the analysis by integrating them out of the joint opinion". Harsanyi (1982) thundered against this proposition, and in our opinion he did so for good reason. For more on that debate, see also Kadane and Larkey (1983) and Shubik (1983) .
9 Indeed, it makes little sense to use other player's preferences to define a player's set of states
In this paper we propose a solution to this problem based on a straightforward generalization of Harsanyi's idea and similar to the one recently devised by Epstein and Wang (1996) .
10 Instead of associating a player's type with a utility function and a probability measure over states of nature and other players' strategies and types, we make every type correspond to an arbitrary preference relation over acts mapping states of nature and other players' strategies and types into outcomes. This procedure avoids assuming utilities and beliefs directly in the description of a player's uncertainty. More importantly, it makes the fact that a player has preferences satisfying Savage's axioms -or, indeed, any other set of axioms -a well defined event for every other player, thus enabling a formal definition of the SEU hypothesis.
11 The implicitly defined hierarchies of beliefs in Harsanyi's model become implicitly defined hierarchies of preferences about preferences here. A type of a player specifies her preference over acts depending on states of nature and other players' strategies (for example, the strategies she has available in the game) but also acts depending on another player's preferences over acts depending on states of nature and other players' strategies, and so on.
Outline of the Results
Our first theorem, analogously to Mertens and Zamir's (1985) main result, shows that in finite games this model carries no loss of generality. We define the set of states of the world for a player as the set of all sequences comprising a state of nature and, for each other player, a strategy and a hierarchy of preference relations. The theorem shows that this space is universal, namely, isomorphic to the set of all tuples consisting of a state of nature and, for each other player, a strategy and a preference relation over acts mapping this player's set of states of the world into outcomes.
In a number of intermediate propositions we then describe the purposes of our model. In particular, following Savage, we say a player is sure about a certain subset of her universal space if her preferences are such that she is indifferent between any two acts delivering the same outcome on that subset. We then identify a class of axioms with the property that, given any set of axioms in this class, subspaces of the universal spaces of uncertainty exist that are also universal and feature this set of axioms at every state of the world of every player. These results enable the analysis of the consequences various axioms have on the players' behavior. As an illustration, we define a notion of rationality and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and show that if a player is sure that the other players' are rational, have preferences satisfying Savage's axioms P1 and P3, are themselves sure, and so on, then strategies of the world and then ask whether this player's preferences on the corresponding acts satisfy a certain axiom, if every player's states of the world are specified in such a way that all other players' preferences automatically satisfy this axiom.
10 We discuss the relationship with Epstein and Wang's paper later on in this introduction. 11 Roughly, this corresponds to the assumption that each player's type is associated to preferences satisfying Savage's axioms, that the corresponding subjective beliefs put probability one on other players' types satisfying Savage's axioms, and so on. not surviving iterated elimination are ruled out.
Finally, we move to our main task, characterizing the SEU assumption. First we prove that, while appropriate for Savage's first five axioms, P1-P5, the notion of sureness above is not adequate for the sixth and key axiom, P6, which proves very far apart from P1-P5 both conceptually and technically. We overcome this difficulty by showing that a player's preferences satisfying P1-P6 can be naturally extended to a much larger family of acts, thus making the fact that another player's preferences in turn satisfy P1-P6 a well defined event. This extension result leads to our second theorem. We construct a universal subspace where each other player's preferences satisfy P1-P6 (as well as an additional axiom that is necessary and sufficient for countable additivity of subjective beliefs) and the corresponding beliefs put probability one on the symmetrically constructed subspaces. For this subspace a second isomorphism holds, with the set of all tuples comprising states of nature and other players' strategies, utility functions, and probability measures over the respective subspaces. Establishing this second isomorphism is our main contribution, as the result provides foundations for both the SEU hypothesis and for Harsanyi's model (in the non-atomic, countably additive case).
While our results demonstrate that Savage's theory is applicable to game situations, 12 it is worth pointing out that they also highlight special features of the theory that arise in these contexts but are typically absent from the one-person case. First, P6 requires that the space of states of the world be infinite. In one-person situations where the latter is not the case, one must appeal to objects that are extraneous to the model (such as an infinite sequence of coin tosses) in order to meet the requirement. Here, however, the necessary cardinality obtains automatically due to the infinite construction. Second, Savage's axioms do not imply countable additivity, which does obtain automatically here. Third, P6 acquires a special meaning; roughly, in our context the axiom says that a player cannot be sure about the precise hierarchies of preference relations of the other players, or even sure they belong to a given finite set. In other words, nontrivial uncertainty of the higher order beliefs is what makes beliefs themselves exist and be unique.
13
12 This is in sharp contrast with the results of Mariotti (1996) . Roughly, the latter paper shows that a player's preference relation on strategies cannot satisfy even a few of Savage's axioms if various game-theoretic notions of rationality regarding the other players are imposed (see Battigalli (1996) for a counterargument to these negative results). Our approach is very different from Mariotti's, mainly because his framework does not allow preferences about preferences, and these are what one uses in our framework (which is built without restrictions) in order to impose axioms, players' sureness about the axioms, and so on. Thus, preferences about preferences may be interpreted as a workaround to the issues raised by Mariotti (thanks to Dale Stahl for suggesting this interpretation).
13 It is well known that P1-P5 are not sufficient for existence of a SEU representation. This may be readily verified by a straightforward adaptation of the famous counterexample by Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg (1959) . With a finite set of outcomes, uniqueness of the SEU representation in general requires an infinite set of states of the world -see Gul (1992) -and, more importantly, non-atomicity of the subjective belief.
Relationship with Earlier Literature on Hierarchies of Preferences
The idea of preferences about preferences is not new. The issues outlined above were first formally dealt with by Epstein and Wang (1996) , who construct universal spaces of uncertainty, and prove analogous theorems, using hierarchies of preference relations in a similar way. The results are complementary. We work with finite games, imposing no axioms along the construction. Epstein and Wang assume the strategy spaces are compact Hausdorff, take the outcome space to be the unit interval, and assume monotone utilities on the latter by requiring that all preferences satisfy a number of axioms. The more restrictive of these, completeness, transitivity and monotonicity, are not automatically satisfied in the finite case.
Compared to that paper, our work has the disadvantage of dealing with finite games only. Indeed, the technical structure of our model does not lend itself well to the case where, say, the set of states of nature is infinite. However, it has two important advantages. First, as noted above and acknowledged by Epstein and Wang themselves, the specification of a player's space of states of the world should presume "as few preference axioms as possible". In our construction preferences are indeed unrestricted, whereas in their paper the restrictions are substantial. Second, our model is much simpler. Even within the SEU subspaces, where the full force of Savage's axioms is imposed, players are only assumed to be able to rank relatively uncomplicated acts -at each level of the hierarchies there are a finite number of acts, a finite number of events these may depend on, and a finite number of outcomes. By contrast, in Epstein and Wang's paper, at each level a player is assumed to make preference comparisons between acts depending on an extremely complex family of events.
14 Plan of the Paper The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews Savage's theory and some other results. The construction of the spaces of uncertainty is carried out in Section 3, where our first theorem is proved. The formalization of the players' beliefs and the discussion about subspaces and iterated elimination appear in Section 4. Our second and main theorem is given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. All proofs appear in Section 7.
Savage's Theory and Other Preliminaries
Typical formulations of the decision-theoretic approach to subjective probability and utility take as given two sets, a space of uncertainty and a space of outcomes, each endowed with an algebra or σ-algebra of subsets. Elements of the space of uncertainty 14 The problem of classes of events that are too rich for a decision maker to conceive is the main motivation for Kopylov's (2002) generalizations of Savage's theorem. One of Kopylov's results is crucial to our proofs and will be recorded in Section 2.
are referred to as states of the world or simply states, and its measurable subsets are called events. 15 In the remainder of this section, X denotes a finite space of outcomes, and Ω a space of uncertainty. The family of events is denoted by A.
An act is a measurable function of Ω into X, and the set of all acts is denoted by F . For any x ∈ X, the constant act that maps every element of Ω to x is simply denoted by x, and given acts f, g and an event A, the act that coincides with f on A and with g on Ω\A is denoted by f A g. A preference relation on F is a binary relation on F , that is, a subset of F × F . For notational convenience, (f, g) ∈ is written f g, whereas f g stands for (f, g) ∈ and (g, f ) / ∈ , and f ∼ g stands for (f, g) ∈ and (g, f ) ∈ . The interpretation of f g is that the decision maker considers act f at least as desirable as act g, whereas indifference f ∼ g (respectively, strict preference f g) requires, in addition, that g be (respectively, be not) as desirable as f . Finally, an event A is said to be null (according to a preference relation ) if f Ah gAh for all acts f, g, h.
Savage's Theorem
A utility function is a map u : X → R. A subjective belief is a finitely additive map P : A → [0, 1] such that P (Ω) = 1. The pair (u, P ) is a subjective expected utility (SEU) representation of a preference relation on F if, for all acts f and g,
In this case, (u, P ) is unique if every SEU representation (u , P ) of satisfies P = P and u = a + bu for some numbers a, b with b > 0. A subjective belief P is convex ranged if for every event A and every 0 ≤ p ≤ P (A) there exists an event B ⊆ A such that P (B) = p. It is dense ranged if for every event A, every 0 ≤ p ≤ P (A), and every > 0 there exists an event B ⊆ A such that − < P (B) − p < . It is non-atomic if for every event A such that P (A) > 0 there exists an event B ⊆ A such that 0 < P (B) < P (A). Finally, if A is a σ-algebra, then P is a probability measure if it is countably additive.
Savage proved that, when A is the family of all subsets of Ω, axioms P1-P6 below imply existence of a unique SEU representation with a nonconstant utility function and a convex ranged subjective belief. His axioms are, in fact, also necessary.
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15 When the space of uncertainty is finite, all its subset are assumed measurable, and similarly for the space of outcomes. In this paper, only finite outcome spaces will be involved, but many spaces of uncertainty will be constructed, both finite and infinite; in the latter case, the relevant algebra or σ-algebra will be specified as the context requires.
16 As is well known, his theorem remains true if A is any σ-algebra (see, for example, Kopylov (2002) ), but in any case countable additivity is not implied by his axioms. Finally, Savage uses seven axioms and does not give them names -we do, following Machina and Schmeidler (1992) -but P1 (Ordering). For all acts f and g, either f g or g f or both. For all acts f , g, and h, if f g and g h then f h. P2 (Sure-Thing Principle). Let A be an event, and let f , g, h, and h be acts. Then f Ah gAh if and only if f Ah gAh .
P3 (Eventwise Monotonicity)
. Let A be a non-null event, let f be an act, and let x and y be outcomes. Then x y if and only if xAf yAf .
P4 (Weak Comparative Probability)
. Let x, y, x , and y be outcomes such that x y and x y , and let A, B be events. Then xAy xBy if and only if x Ay x By .
P5 (Nondegeneracy).
There exist outcomes x and y such that x y.
P6 (Small Event Continuity). Let f and g be acts such that f g, and let x be an outcome. Then there exists a finite, measurable partition
The following axiom has been proposed several years after Savage's work -originally by Villegas (1964) and then, as stated here, by Arrow (1971) . In the presence of P1-P6, it is necessary and sufficient for countable additivity of the subjective belief in the SEU representation.
UM (Uniform Monotonicity)
. Let f and g be acts such that f g, let x be an outcome, and let A 1 , A 2 , . . . be events such that A n+1 ⊆ A n for all n ≥ 1 and ∩ n≥1 A n = ∅. There exists N ≥ 1 such that xA n f g and f xA n g for all n ≥ N .
The next theorem -see Arrow (1971) for a proof -summarizes our discussion. For ease of future reference, we will refer to it simply as "Savage's Theorem".
Savage's Theorem. Assume A is a σ-algebra. Then satisfies P1-P6 if and only if there exist a nonconstant utility function u and a convex ranged subjective belief P such that (u, P ) is a SEU representation of . In this case, (u, P ) is unique, and P is a probability measure if and only if satisfies UM.
Some Useful Results
It has been shown very recently that Savage's theory remains valid if A is only required to be an algebra -indeed, P1-P6 make perfect sense in this case as well. This fact is recorded in the next theorem, a result that will prove extremely useful in our proofs. For the proof of this and also other, even more general results, see Kopylov (2002) .
the seventh is only needed when X is infinite, as it is otherwise implied by the first two (this is the content of Lemma 1 below).
Kopylov's Theorem. Assume A is an algebra. Then satisfies P1-P6 if and only if there exist a nonconstant utility function u and a dense ranged subjective belief P such that (u, P ) is a SEU representation of . In this case, (u, P ) is unique.
Note that, besides UM, 17 the only formal difference from Savage's Theorem is that the subjective belief is dense ranged rather than convex ranged.
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We conclude this section with a simple, well known result. Its conclusion, which holds whether A is an algebra or a σ-algebra, is Savage's seventh axiom, P7.
Lemma 1. Let f be an act, let A be an event, and let x be an outcome. Assume satisfies P1 and P3. If x f (ω) for all ω ∈ A, then xAf f . If f (ω) x for all ω ∈ A, then f xAf .
States of the World in Games
A finite set Θ of states of nature, a finite set {1, . . . , I} of players, and for each player i a finite set S i of strategies, a finite set X i of outcomes with |X i | ≥ 2, and an outcome function φ i : Θ × S → X i are taken as given. The set S 1 × · · · × S I is denoted by S, and for every player i the set
, and conversely, given s −i ∈ S −i , the coordinate of s −i corresponding to player j = i is denoted by s j . Similar obvious abbreviations will be used later, without explicit definition, for analogous objects.
Every s i ∈ S i can be identified with the function (θ,
, an act a la Savage. As explained in the introduction, however, the set Θ × S −i should not be regarded as i's set of states of the world, as doing so we would exclude other players' preferences from i's uncertainty, thus preventing an appropriate formalization of the SEU hypothesis (and indeed of any other hypothesis on preferences). In order to model higher order uncertainty, we may then assume preferences about preferences, as follows. A set of types for each player i is assumed, endowed with an algebra or σ-algebra of subsets. Then, corresponding to each type of i, a preference relation is specified on the set of measurable functions mapping states of nature and other players' strategies and types into X i . This implicitly defines hierarchies of preferences about preferences up to any arbitrary level.
19 In the remainder of this section we 17 In fact, UM, like P1-P6, also makes sense when A is only required to be an algebra, and in the presence of P1-P6 it is again necessary and sufficient for countable additivity. However, this fact is not mentioned in Kopylov (2002) , and it is not needed for the purposes of this paper anyway.
18 Recall that a σ-algebra cannot be countably infinite, but an algebra may very well be. The convex range condition in Savage's Theorem is obviously sufficient for non-atomicity, and also necessary in the countably additive case (by Lyapunov's theorem -see e.g. Lindenstrauss (1966) ) but not necessary in the finitely additive case (as shown by the counterexample in Nunke and Savage (1952) ). However, the dense range condition in Kopylov's Theorem is neither sufficient (as demonstrated by an example in Wakker (1993) ) nor necessary (again by Nunke and Savage (1952) ).
19 We will explain this below, in the discussion following our first theorem.
rigorously formulate this idea by constructing hierarchies of preferences explicitly and proving their main properties.
Universal Spaces of Uncertainty
Define Ω Higher order uncertainty is then modelled assuming preferences about preferences, that is, assuming that i may be able to rank not just the elements of F 0 i , but also acts whose outcome depends on θ, s −i , and also on each other player j's preferences on F 0 j . Next, preferences of i over acts depending on the symmetrically constructed preferences of the other players are assumed, and so on.
20 Thus, define 
i . Thus, it is meaningful to say a relation
In order to define all higher order spaces of uncertainty, we proceed recursively as follows. Let n ≥ 1 and assume defined, for every i and every 1 ≤ m ≤ n, finite sets Ω With these recursion hypotheses in place, define for every j = i and every 1 ≤ m ≤ n , 20 This is the natural generalization of the familiar hierarchies of probabilistic beliefs constructed by Mertens and Zamir (1985) . Indeed, if we were to assume utilities and probabilities at the outset, then each (θ, s) ∈ Θ × S would be associated with a utility number for i, and therefore i's beliefs about the state of nature and about other players' strategies and beliefs would unambiguously define a preference relation for i on acts that depend on the state of nature and the other players' strategies and beliefs. 
The following lemma completes the recursion and shows it is well defined.
Lemma 2. For every player i, every n ≥ 0, and every ω n i ∈ Ω n i , the set (π n i ) −1 (ω n i ) has at least two elements. In particular, π n i is onto. Now define, for every player i,
By Lemma 2, this space is a continuum, and its projection on Ω n i is onto for all n ≥ 0. Let π n i denote this projection, observe that Ω n i naturally induces a finite partition of Ω i , namely , and A n i is a finite sub-algebra of the algebra
which makes Ω i into a well defined space of uncertainty. We will refer to Ω i , endowed with the algebra A i , as player i's space of uncertainty, and to the elements of Ω i as the states of the world of player i. Note that A i is countably infinite.
Letting F i be the corresponding set of acts, and denoting by P i the set of all preference relations on F i , we note that for all n ≥ 0 the set F n i can be seen as the subset of F i whose elements have the form f n i • π n i for some f n i ∈ F n i -these are the acts in F i that are measurable with respect to A n i . Thus, following earlier terminology, say a relation i ∈ P i agrees with (or induces, or extends) a relation
The first theorem in the paper is based on the crucial observation that the family F i has, in fact, no other members than those of
By this proposition, for every player j and every sequence of relations 0 j , 1 j , . . . such that n+1 j agrees with n j for all n ≥ 0 there is a unique relation in P j that extends them all. Conversely, of course, an element of P j uniquely defines such a sequence of relations. Thus, the function of
where, for every player j = i, j is the unique preference relation on F j extending each of 0 j , 1 j , . . ., is a well defined bijection. Written using more suggestive notation, the fact just proved constitutes the first theorem in the paper.
For ease of notation, based on the latter result, in what follows an element of Ω i will be often simply written as (θ, s −i , −i ).
Discussion
The analysis above has the same purpose as that of Mertens and Zamir (1985) . In a nutshell, Theorem 1 says that preference relations can be used without loss of generality in games, whereas Mertens and Zamir's main result says that the same is true for Harsanyi's types. The spaces Ω i and P i logically correspond to the "universal beliefs space" and the "universal type space", respectively, in that paper.
As indicated at the beginning of this section, one may describe a strategic situation by means of a Harsanyi-like model, assuming a measurable space of types for every player i -say (T i , T i ), with T i an algebra or σ-algebra -and, for every t i ∈ T i , a preference relation -say t i -over the measurable mappings of Θ × S −i × T −i into X i . Then every t i ∈ T i uniquely corresponds to a hierarchy of preferences -on F Note that finite sets Θ and S 1 , . . . , S I constitute the basic uncertainty spaces here, whereas in Mertens and Zamir the basic uncertainty space is a compact set. Now for every player i and every n ≥ 0 the space Ω n i is finite, whereas the cardinality of the 21 Since Theorem 1 is based on the assumption that the relevant class of events for i is A i , it suffices to assume that, in fact, T i is an algebra containing some or all of T 0 i , T 1 i , . . .. In the next sections it will become clear that there is indeed no need to work with σ-algebras at this point.
lower-order spaces is already very high in Mertens and Zamir's construction, and this would be so even if their basic uncertainty space were assumed to be finite. Since utility functions and subjective beliefs correspond to a particular kind of preference relations, it might be argued, on the contrary, that the spaces constructed in this paper should be larger. In other words, it is natural to ask whether we are really missing something relevant here.
The answer is a qualified "no". The reason for the simpler construction is that only a finite (but exhaustive) number of sets of utility functions and subjective beliefs appear at each level. This depends, of course, on the fact that for every n ≥ 0 the set Ω n i is finite, hence no preference relation in P . ., will result. This is precisely the idea behind the development in Section 5.
In order to formalize this idea, we must first discuss some technical matters, and in particular the formalization of the players' beliefs in our framework. The next section is concerned with the question of whether there is a satisfactory way to formally state the fact that a player is sure every other player's preferences satisfy a certain set of axioms, is sure every other player is sure every other player's preferences satisfy a certain set of axioms, and so on.
Beliefs and Axioms on Preferences
Following Savage, we say player i is sure about (or believes) an event E i ∈ A i , when entertaining preferences i , provided that Ω i \ E i is i -null. Then, for each other player j, we define
Note that, by definition of A i , for some n ≥ 0 we have E i ∈ A n i and, therefore, B j (E i ) ∈ A m j for all m > n. In other words, the fact that player i is sure about an event in A i is itself an event in A j for every player j = i. More generally, for every N ≥ 2, every sequence of players i 1 , . . . , i N such that i n = i n+1 for every 1 ≤ n < N , and every E i N ∈ A i N ,
This is the event, from i 1 's viewpoint, that i 2 believes that . . . i N −1 believes that i N is sure about E i N .
The fact that a player other than i has preferences satisfying a certain axiom cannot be expressed as an event in A i . Given n ≥ 0 and E i ∈ A n+1 i , saying that a certain state (θ, s −i , −i ) belongs to E i puts restrictions on θ, on s −i , and on each other player j's preferences over acts that are measurable with respect to A n j . However, it puts no restrictions on how j compares all other acts. Thus, for instance, it seems impossible to check whether i believes (according to some preference relation in P i ) that j's preferences satisfy P1-P5. Events in A i are too coarse for this.
Proposition 2. For every player i, every E i ∈ A i , and every (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ E i there exists −i ∈ P −i such that (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ E i and j violates P1 for each player j = i.
A related limitation of the algebra A i is that no sufficiently long statement of sureness about sureness may hold everywhere within a given event in A i .
Proposition 3. For every player i, every nonempty E i ∈ A i , every player j, and every E j ∈ A j such that E j = Ω j there exists N ≥ 0 such that
Taken together, these two propositions offer a daunting prospect. Theorem 1 relies on the assumption that A i is the relevant class of events for player i, and yet these seem not even suitable to express the fact that another player's preferences satisfy Savage's first axiom. The validity of the theorem would be compromised, should A i prove not rich enough in this respect. Indeed, our main objective is to establish conditions on i's preferences characterizing not just the assumption that a SEU representation exists (we know that P1-P6 are necessary and sufficient for this) but also the assumption that i believes every other player's preferences have a SEU representation, believes every other player believes every other player's preferences have a SEU representation, and so on. More generally, given a set of axioms α j for each player j -not necessarily the same for all players -it is desirable to have a method to find conditions on i's preferences guaranteeing that i believes each other player j's preferences satisfy α j , believes each other player j believes each other player k's preferences satisfy α k , and so on.
These difficulties can be successfully overcome, but this must be done differently according to the sets of axioms considered. In this section we deal with sets of axioms (among which P1-P5) which we term closed. In Section 5, we deal with P1-P6.
A More General Definition of Sureness
For any player j, axioms P1-P5 hold for a preference relation on F j if and only if they hold for all induced relations on F 0 j , F 1 j , . . .. Thus, for every player i = j,
is an intersection of events in A i -this will be proved later in this section. The idea is to identify i's sureness about j's preferences satisfying P1-P5 with i's sureness about all the events in the intersection, thus extending the definition of sureness to a larger class of subsets than A i -for example, a singleton in Ω i is an intersection of events in A i but is not itself an event.
To formalize this idea, observe that for every
) for all n ≥ 0, and moreover
Thus, according to the definition of sureness given earlier, if E i ∈ A i and i is sure about E i , then i is also sure about (π
The key observation is that if, conversely, i is sure about all these events, then it is meaningful to say i is sure about E i even if E i / ∈ A i , provided the inclusion above is, in fact, an equality. Indeed, if the inclusion is strict, then one has no reason to insist that i is sure about E i and not just, say, about E i ∪{ω i }, where ω i is any state such that ω i ∈ (π
On the other hand, if equality holds, no such concern arises. Accordingly, say E i ⊆ Ω i is closed if
. In this case, based on the arguments just given, say i is sure about (or believes) E i , when entertaining preferences i , provided that Ω i \(π
is null according to i for all n ≥ 0. Note that every event in A i is a closed subset, and that the definition of sureness just given indeed generalizes the previous one -if E i ∈ A i then, for some n ≥ 0,
for all m ≥ n. The following lemma records some basic properties of closed subsets.
Lemma 3. A subset of Ω i is closed if and only if it is an intersection of events in
A i , and therefore any intersection of closed subsets of Ω i is a closed subset of Ω i .
Another fundamental property of closed subsets is that the fact that player i is sure about a closed subset E i of Ω i in turn takes the form of a closed subset of Ω j for every player j = i. Extending the notation introduced earlier, define
) is a closed subset of Ω j for every player j = i and every m ≥ 1. Moreover,
As before, it follows that for every N ≥ 2, every sequence of players i 1 , . . . , i N such that i n = i n+1 for every 1 ≤ n < N , and every closed subset E i N of Ω i N ,
is a closed subset of Ω i 1 . This expresses the fact, from i 1 's viewpoint, that i 2 believes that . . . i N −1 believes that i N is sure about E i N .
Closed Sets of Axioms and Uncertainty Subspaces
Let α i denote a set of axioms that a preference relation in P i may satisfy -for example, P1-P5. We say α i is closed if it contains P1 and (k, s −j , −j ) ∈ Ω j i satisfies α i is a closed subset of Ω j for every player j = i. Now consider a profile of closed sets of axioms α = (α 1 , . . . , α I ). Then for every player i we define
j satisfies α j for all j = i and, recursively, for all n ≥ 0,
The recursion is well defined, because if Ω α,n i is closed then B i (Ω α,n j ) is closed (by Lemma 4) and therefore so is Ω α,n+1 i (by Lemma 3). Finally, we define
By construction, at each state of the world in Ω α i , every player j = i has preferences satisfying α j , is sure every player k = j has preferences satisfying α k , and so on. Moreover, Ω α i contains any other subset of Ω i with these properties, and being an intersection of closed subsets, it is itself closed. Further, it satisfies the following. In applications of our model, the players' preferences will have to obey a profile α of sets of axioms. If these are closed, then the latter proposition, paired with the next two, guarantees that one may safely ignore states outside Ω α i , regard Ω α i as player i's space of uncertainty, and assume preferences directly on the corresponding set of acts, provided P1 is satisfied. Every E i ⊆ Ω i can be seen as a space of uncertainty in its own right, when endowed with the algebra
Let F i | E i denote the corresponding set of acts, and note that a function of E i into X i belongs to this set if and only if it is the restriction to E i of some function in
Proposition 5. A preference relation i on F i satisfies P1 and is such that player i is sure about a closed subset E i of Ω i if and only if there exists a preference relation i | E i on F i | E i that satisfies P1 and is such that
for all f i , g i ∈ F i . In this case, i | E i is unique and satisfies P2,P3,P4,P5 if and only if i satisfies P2,P3,P4,P5, respectively.
Proposition 6. For every distinct players i and j,
is a closed subset of Ω i .
If α i is a subset of P1-P5 for every player i, the last three propositions together imply that (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ Ω α i if and only if for every player j = i there exists a preference relation j | Ω α j over F i | Ω α j that satisfies α j and is such that
for all f, g ∈ F j . Moreover, this relation j | Ω α j is unique. We may then summarize these facts as Ω
, where P α j is the set of preference relations on F i | Ω α j satisfying α j , for each player j. What about sets of axioms other than P1-P5? Our conjecture is that, as long as we restrict attention to closed sets of axioms α 1 , . . . , α I , a result analogous to Proposition 5 can be proved -with P2,P3,P4,P5 replaced by all axioms in α i other than P1. Such a result, together with Proposition 4, will again deliver an isomorphism like the one above, that is, it will again guarantee that we can safely regard the corresponding space Ω α i as player i's space of uncertainty, and assume preferences directly on the corresponding set of acts. The verification of this conjecture, of course, will have to be done case by case.
Example: Rationality and Iterated Dominance
A widely accepted principle among game theorists is that only outcomes surviving all rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies may possibly make sense. While this idea hinges on the assumption that each player is rational, knows each other player is rational, and so on, intuition suggests that its validity should, in fact, not depend on the assumption that all players have preferences represented by utility functions and probabilistic beliefs. Using our framework, we will now show that this principle is indeed independent of the traditional description of a game, in the sense that it holds even if the players' preferences are far from having a SEU representation.
For every player i, list the outcomes as
, and say a preference relation i ∈ P i is ordinal if, for all r, r = 1, . . . , |X i |, x r i i x r i if and only if r ≥ r. For every S −i ⊆ S −i , say a strategy s i ∈ S i is ordinally strictly dominated given S −i if there is another strategy s i ∈ S i such that, given an ordinal preference relation i , φ i (θ, s i , s −i ) i φ i (θ, s i , s −i ) for every θ ∈ Θ and every s −i ∈ S −i . Further, say s i survives ordinal iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies if s i is not ordinally strictly dominated given any of S If player i is sure every other player has ordinal preferences, is sure every other player has ordinal preferences, and so on, what other circumstances guarantee that i is, in addition, sure that every other player will choose only strategies surviving ordinal iterated elimination? Given (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ Ω i , say player j = i is rational if for no s j ∈ S j is it the case that s j j s j . Further, say j is 0-dominance rational if, in addition, the preference relation induced by j on F 0 j is ordinal and satisfies P1 and P3. Finally, recursively for all n > 0, say j is n-dominance rational if j is (n − 1)-dominance rational and the preference relation induced by j on F n j is such that j is sure every other player is (n − 1)-dominance rational. Note that this is well defined; indeed, let
Thus, if player i is sure that every other player j is rational, has ordinal preferences satisfying P1 and P3, is in turn sure every other player k is rational and has ordinal preferences satisfying P1 and P3, and so on (for a finite number of statements) then i is also sure that every other player j must choose a strategy surviving ordinal iterated elimination. Note that very little machinery is required to establish this result; indeed, the restrictions on j's preferences -that they satisfy P1 and P3, and be ordinal and such that j is sure, and on on -involve only the induced preferences on F m j for some finite m, and P1 and P3 are, in fact, only required for the induced preferences on F 0 j .
Subjective Expected Utility
Axiom P6 has a completely different nature than P1-P5. A relation i on F i may very well satisfy P1-P6, because A i is infinite, but the induced relations on F 0 i , F 1 i , . . . will necessarily violate P6, because the latter sets of acts are finite. Further, the fact that i's preferences satisfy P1-P6 does not take the form of a closed subset of Ω j for another player j, and therefore it is not clear how to express j's sureness about it. Define Ω
is not closed, for every player i.
In view of this result, the natural question is then whether the σ-algebra generated by A i is rich enough to isolate not just P1-P5, but also P6. It turns out that it is indeed. Moreover, it also tells whether any player j = i is sure each other player is sure each other player is sure . . . each other player's preferences satisfy the axioms. For all this, however, yet another generalization of the definition of sureness is needed.
Yet Another, More General Definition of Sureness
Let A * i be the σ-algebra on Ω i generated by A i , and denote by F * i the set of functions of Ω i into X i that are measurable with respect to A * i . Finally, say a preference relation * i on F * i agrees with (or induces, or extends) a preference relation i on F i , provided
Of course, many preference relations on F * i extend a given relation on F i . However, whenever the latter satisfies P1-P6, there is only one natural choice.
Proposition 9. Let i be a player. A preference relation i on F i satisfies P1-P6 if and only if it is induced by a preference relation * i on F * i satisfying P1-P6 and UM. In this case, * i is unique. Thus, if (and only if) i satisfies P1-P6, then it is as if player i were able to express preference comparisons between acts in F * i , and abode by P1-P6 and UM in doing so. We will see shortly that extending the definition of sureness to events in A * i is necessary for our purposes. More generally, one may argue that σ-algebras are the "right" mathematical structures to employ. The fundamental extension result above shows that this involves no difficulties. One can still assume, as we do, that the simple events in the algebra A i are the "real thing" for player i, what i is actually concerned with. Preferences on acts depending on the much more complicated events in the A * i will be still unambiguously identified if P1-P6 are satisfied, and the definition of sureness will accordingly extend to all such events.
Say player i is sure about (or believes) an event E i ∈ A * i that is not a closed subset (when entertaining preferences i satisfying P1-P6) provided that Ω i \ E i is null according to the unique relation on F * i that extends i and satisfies P1-P6 and UM. As before, for all j = i let
i satisfies P1-P6 and i believes E i .
These definitions are precisely what we need in order to meaningfully construct a universal subspace of Ω i where each player j = i has preferences satisfying P1-P6, is sure each other player k = j has preferences satisfying P1-P6, and so on. We begin with the following proposition, which shows that the fact that each other player j's preferences satisfy P1-P6 is an event in A * i .
Proposition 10. For every player i there is a collection of events
Next, we note that the fact that each other player j has preferences satisfying P1-P6, is sure each other player k has preferences satisfy P1-P6, and so on, is also an event -this follows by an immediate inductive argument using the next proposition.
Proposition 11. For every player i let E i ⊆ Ω σ,0 i be such that
for some collection of events
Then for every player i there exists a collection of events
By these propositions, the following are well defined events in A * i . First,
Next, recursively for all n ≥ 1,
i . Note that a state of the world in Ω i belongs to Ω σ i if and only if, at that state, every player j = i has preferences satisfying P1-P6, is sure every other player has preferences satisfying P1-P6, is sure every other player is sure every other player has preferences satisfying P1-P6, and so on. Thus, Ω σ i contains any other subset of Ω i with these properties. Moreover, the following is true.
The second theorem in the paper is an immediate consequence of the latter proposition. Analogously to Proposition 5, the next result shows that if (and only if) player i is sure about an event E i ∈ A * i , then one may regard E i as i's space of uncertainty, and assume preferences directly on the corresponding space of acts.
As before, E i can be seen as an uncertainty space, together with the σ-algebra
Now let F *
i | E i denote the corresponding set of acts, and note that a function of E i into X i belongs to this set if and only if it is the restriction to E i of some act in F * i . Accordingly, denote a generic element of 
Proposition 12 and Lemma 5 together imply that for every (θ, 
that satisfies P1-P6 and UM and is such that, for every
if and only if f j * j g j , where * j is the unique extension of j to F * j satisfying P1-P6 and UM. Moreover, * j | Ω σ j is unique, and it has a unique SEU representation.
For every player j, let P σ j denote the set of all preference relations on F * j | Ω σ j satisfying P1-P6 and UM. Next, let U j denote the set of all equivalence classes of utility functions on X j -where any two are equivalent if they are positive affine transformations of each other. Finally, let ∆ σ j denote the set of all non-atomic (or, equivalently, convex ranged) probability measures on A * j | Ω σ j . Then, once again using a more suggestive notation, we write the facts just proved as follows.
If, and only if, player i has preferences on F i satisfying P1-P6 and, moreover, the corresponding preferences on F * i given by Proposition 9 are such that i is sure about Ω σ i , then it is as if player i had in mind a utility function on X i and a probability distribution on A * i | Ω σ i -that is, a probabilistic belief over the states of nature and the other players' strategies, utility functions and probabilistic beliefs.
Discussion
Player i's preferences over F * i | Ω σ i must satisfy P1-P6 in order to have a unique SEU representation. Thus, Savage's theory proves perfectly applicable to game contexts, and provides a truly subjective foundation to Harsanyi's model, but only under the hypothesis that i does not believe with probability one that each other player is one of a finite number of types.
Indeed, even assuming i's preferences satisfy P1-P5, a SEU representation exists (and is unique) if and only if P6 is also satisfied, that is, if and only if i entertains nontrivial beliefs about the other players' higher order beliefs. This implication of P6 is, of course, entirely new to game contexts. Finite type spaces are well known to imply some loss of generality, as they assume that all interactive beliefs of sufficiently high order are commonly known by all players. Our results provide further evidence that such models are problematic.
As an example, consider a Battle of the Sexes game situation, where husband and wife must choose between Football and Opera. This situation is usually formalized by attaching payoffs as in the game depicted in Figure Football is a Nash equilibrium of the game, the following scenario cannot be justified using our analysis. The husband is sure his wife attaches utilities 0,1,2 to being separate, together at football, and together at opera, respectively, she is sure he attaches utilities 0,1,2 to being separate, together at opera, and together at football, respectively, each is sure the other is sure, and so on. Moreover, both choose football, each is sure the other chooses football, each is sure the other is sure, and so on. Such a claim does not make sense in our framework, because, for example, changing the wife's utilities to ,1,2 (for any < 1) does not change her preferences. But if we are willing to say that the husband (wife) does not take his wife's (her husband's) utility numbers 0,1,2 too seriously, in the sense that he (she) is, say, sure the utilities are ,1,2 (δ,1,2) but unsure what (δ) is, then nontrivial uncertainty at the higher orders may arise (even if and δ are small, different values will induce different preferences at the higher orders), and the underlying preferences may, in fact, satisfy Savage's axioms. These arguments are, of course, extremely sketchy, and only meant to suggest the questions that our analysis leaves open. We have dealt with iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies formally in the paper, but we have said nothing about correlated and Nash equilibria. Establishing the precise connection with existing, equilibrium-based game theory deserves separate research.
Conclusion
In the first part of this work it is shown that in finite games Harsanyi's idea of describing implicitly the players'uncertainty by means of types generalizes to preference relations. This result implies that a game can be analyzed in a fully satisfactory way using the tools already established in decision theory but long neglected in game theory -preference relations, and their axioms. Savage's notion of sureness is then meaningfully employed to describe subspaces where a set of axioms holds and players are "commonly sure" about this. While here this is done explicitly only for Savage's axioms, similar treatment can quite possibly be given for other axiomatics, in analogous fashion. Investigation of these alternative models awaits further research, but the foundations are ready.
In the second part of the paper, foundations for SEU theory and for the players' common assumption of it are provided. The analysis respects the spirit of Savage's classic work as much as possible, and indeed his model proves perfectly applicable to game situations without changing his axioms in any respect. But additional features of Savage's theory arise in games, namely, the special meaning of P6 and, especially, countable additivity, which is not implied by P1-P6 in general but does obtain automatically in this framework.
Although the theory developed here does not address the problem of elicitation of utilities and probabilities, the construction does suggest a method that can, at least in principle, be used for that purpose; a player could be asked a sequence of relatively simple questions -what are his preferences over F 0 i , over F 1 i , and so on, with a finite number of questions at each step, and each question involving finite objects only -whose answers would reveal exactly his utilities and beliefs. Such elicitation procedure is the subject of ongoing research.
Finally, an important task for future research is linking the theory of Section 5 with existing game theory. For example, imposing not only Savage's axioms but also rationality (as we have done when dealing with iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies in Proposition 7) and properly constructing a single uncertainty space for all players would constitute a definition of ex post subjective correlated equilibrium that covers both complete and incomplete information games, 22 then further imposing common priors (which in our model can be expressed via appropriate conditions on preferences) would restrict the notion to ex post correlated equilibrium, and so on. We hope to explore all these issues in the near future.
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. List the elements of X as x 1 , . . . , x |X| , let f 0 = f and, for all r = 1, . . . , |X|, define A r = f −1 (x r ) ∩ A and recursively f r = xA r f r−1 . If x f (ω) for all ω ∈ A (respectively, f (ω)
x for all ω ∈ A), then f r f r−1 for every r = 1, . . . , |X| (respectively, f r−1 f r for every r = 1, . . . , |X|). This follows from P3 if A r is non-null and from the definition of null event otherwise. Since f |X| = xAf and f 0 = f , the result follows from repeated application of the second part of P1.
Proof of Lemma 2. The result was already established for n = 0. Now assume it holds for n = m − 1 ≥ 0, and choose any ω 
Proof of Proposition 1. It suffices to prove that the family on the right-hand side contains F i . By definition of A i , for every g i ∈ F i and x i ∈ X i there exists n g i ,x i ≥ 0 which is the smallest n ≥ 0 such that g
i is a well defined finite number, and g
. Define j for every j = i by establishing that f j j g j for those acts f j , g j ∈ {h n j • π n j | h n j ∈ F n j } such that f j j g j , and only for those acts. Clearly, j violates the first part of P1. However, it induces the same preference relation on F n j as j , hence (θ,
Proof of Proposition 3. Let n ≥ n ≥ 0 be such that E i ∈ A n +1 i and E j ∈ A n j , and if n ≥ 1 assume without loss of generality that E j / ∈ A n−1 j . First note that
for every player i M = j. Suppose this is not true, and take any (θ,
. This is impossible, because E j = Ω j and, if n > 0, E j / ∈ A n−1 j , hence for every two distinct x j , y j ∈ X j it is not the case that x j E j y j j x j . It follows by induction that
for every M ≥ 1 and every sequence of players i 1 , . . . , i M such that i = i 1 , j = i M and i m = i m+1 for all 1 ≤ m < M . Now let N = n − n and M > N and choose such a sequence of players. Also let (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ E i and define k for every player k = i by establishing that f k k g k for all
, hence, as before, for every two distinct x i 1 , y i 1 ∈ X i 1 it is not the case that
Proof of Lemma 3. A closed subset of Ω i is an intersection of events in A i by definition. Conversely, suppose E i is an intersection of events in A i , denote these by A 
, for all n ≥ 0, and on the other hand
, for all n ≥ 0, which implies that ω i ∈ A n i for all n ≥ 0, hence ω i ∈ E i . The proof of the first part is complete. Any intersection of intersections of events in A i is again an intersection of events in A i . By the first part of the lemma, it follows that any intersection of closed subsets of Ω i is again a closed subset of Ω i .
Proof of Lemma 4. Since B j ((π
for all n ≥ 0, and
it follows by Lemma 3 that B j (E m i ) is a closed subset of Ω j . Moreover,
is also a closed subset of Ω j , again by Lemma 3. Proof of Proposition 4. The first and fourth line below hold by definition; the second follows exchanging indices; the third is true by Lemma 4.
Since i is transitive, to prove this is well defined it suffices to prove that h i i h i for every h i , h i ∈ F i such that
is obviously unique, and satisfies P1 because i does. Conversely, let i | E i be a preference relation on F i | E i that satisfies P1 and is such that 
i , since each j = i is 0-dominance rational, the relation induced on F 0 j by j satisfies P1 and P3, thus if s j were ordinally strictly dominated given S −j , say by s j , it would follow that s j j s j , hence that j is not rational, a contradiction.
Thus, Θ×S n −j ×P −j is non-null, and Ω j \Θ×S n −j ×P −j is null, according to j . Thus, if s j were ordinally strictly dominated given S n −j , say by s j , again by the fact that the relation induced by j on F 0 j satisfies P1 and P3 it would follow that s j j s j , again contradiction rationality. Thus, s j is not ordinally strictly dominated given S n −j , and therefore (θ,
Proof of Proposition 8. Let Ω i denote the set of all (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ Ω i such that, for every player j = i and every n ≥ 0, there exists a preference relation on F j which satisfies P1-P6 and extends the relation on = Ω i . For each player j = i, choose some x j ∈ X j and ω j ∈ Ω j , and define a utility function u j on X j and a subjective belief P j on A j as follows: for every y j ∈ X j , u j (y j ) = 1 if y j = x j and u j (y j ) = 0 otherwise; for every A j ∈ A j , P j (A j ) = 1 if ω j ∈ A j and P j (A j ) = 0 otherwise. Next, denote by j the preference relation on F j represented by u j and P j , and note that j does not satisfy P1-P6, as P j is not dense ranged. Then, since Ω i is closed, it suffices to show that (θ,
(Ω i )) for every n ≥ 1, every θ ∈ Θ, and every s −i ∈ S −i . Let n ≥ 1, and define a subjective belief P j on A j for every player j = i as follows:
, and recursively for all m ≥ n and all A j ∈ A m j ,
By Lemma 2, P j is dense ranged. Thus, the preference relation j on F j represented by u j and P j satisfies P1-P6. Since P j (A j ) = P j (A j ) for all A j ∈ A n−1 j , j induces on F n−1 j the same preference relation as j . Thus, since (θ,
) for all θ ∈ Θ and all s −i ∈ S −i , (θ, s −i , −i ) must also be. The proof of Proposition 9 uses the following two lemmata.
Lemma 6. The algebra A i contains no strictly increasing sequence of events, and therefore any subjective belief on A i is, in fact, countably additive, and has a unique extension to a probability measure on A * , . . . . Now n k,k ≥ k for all k ≥ 0, because n k,0 < n k,1 < n k,2 < . . .. Thus, for n ≥ 0 and k ≥ m n , it must be that n k,k ≥ n, hence D . . do not exist. Thus, any subjective belief on A i is, in fact, countably additive, and by Carathéodory's extension theorem (see, for example, Williams (1991), p. 20) it has a unique extension to a probability measure on A * i . Lemma 7. A probability measure P * i on A * i is non-atomic if and only if its restriction to A i is a dense ranged subjective belief.
Proof. Suppose E i ∈ A * i is an atom of P * i , that is, P * i (E i ) > 0 and, for every A * i E i ⊆ E i , either P * i (E i ) = 0 or P * i (E i ) = P * i (E i ). Then it must be the case that for every n ≥ 0 there exists ω 
for every n ≥ 0. Since P i is countably additive and P i (E i ∩ (π n i ) −1 (ω n i )) = P i (E i ) for every n ≥ 0,
) is nonempty. But the latter can contain at most one element of Ω i , hence it contains exactly one. Thus, if P * i has an atom, then P * i ({ω i }) > 0 for some ω i ∈ Ω i . The converse is obviously also true. Thus, P * i has an atom if and only if P * i ({ω i }) > 0 for some ω i ∈ Ω i . Now suppose P * i ({ω i }) > 0 for some ω i ∈ Ω i , define ω n i = π n i (ω i ) for every n ≥ 0, and choose 0 < < P * i ({ω i }). By countable additivity of P * i , there exists N ≥ 0 such that Proof of Proposition 11. Since E i ⊆ Ω σ,0 i , for every (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ E i and every player j = i there exists a unique probability measure P * j ( j ) on A * j which, together with some utility function on X j , constitutes a SEU representation of the unique extension of j to F * j satisfying P1-P6 and UM. This probability measure is a convex ranged, hence non-atomic subjective belief. It follows that ∩ j =i B i (E j ) = ∩ j =i (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ Ω i j believes E j = ∩ j =i (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ Ω i P * j ( j )(∩ n≥0 ∪ m≥0 A j (n, m)) = 1 = ∩ j =i ∩ n≥0 (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ Ω i P * j ( j )(∪ m≥0 A j (n, m)) = 1 = ∩ j =i ∩ n≥0 ∩ k≥0 ∪ m≥0 C i (j, n, m , m), where C i (j, n, m , M ) is the set of all those (θ, s −i , −i ) ∈ Ω i such that Since ∪ M m=0 A j (n, m) ∈ A j for all j, n, M , it follows that C i (j, n, m , M ) ∈ A i for all j, n, m , M . Now an immediate relabelling concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12. For any player j = i and any sequence of events E 1 j , E
